Performance management, gaming and regulatory monitoring: a theoretical model and applications

Shlomo Mizrahi, Yizhaq Minchuk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper addresses the problems of gaming behaviour as expressed in untruthful reporting, manipulation of data and performance measures, and distortion of information. We apply game-theoretical principal-agent reasoning that refers to the marginal costs and benefits of gaming and oversight, pointing to policy measures for ensuring more effort exerted in productive activity rather than in gaming activity. These measures are the regulatory monitoring of agents’ activities rather than the control and supervision of them. We base our suggestions on behavioural economics and nudge research. Regulatory monitoring mechanisms are transparent and ‘soft’, so they moderate the adversarial nature of principal-agent relations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1152-1168
Number of pages17
JournalPublic Management Review
Issue number6
StatePublished - 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.


  • Behavioural economics
  • Gaming and distortion
  • Performance efforts
  • Performance management
  • Regulatory monitoring

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Public Administration


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