Perception games and privacy

Ronen Gradwohl; Rann Smorodinsky

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006

Perception games and privacy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	293-308
Number of pages	16
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	104
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006
State	Published - Jul 2017
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

Perception games
Privacy
Signaling games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006

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title = "Perception games and privacy",

abstract = "Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency.",

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year = "2017",

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doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006",

language = "English",

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AU - Smorodinsky, Rann

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AB - Players have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency.

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KW - Privacy

KW - Signaling games

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.006

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VL - 104

SP - 293

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Perception games and privacy

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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