Pareto optimal equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing

György Dósa, Leah Epstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Bin packing problems deal with packing a set of items with sizes in (0, 1] into a minimum number of subsets, called bins, whose total sizes are no larger than 1. We study a class of bin packing games where the cost of an item packed into a bin with k items is 1k, that is, the cost sharing of each bin is uniform. We study the quality of strictly Pareto optimal equilibria and weakly Pareto optimal equilibria for these games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)827-847
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Combinatorial Optimization
Volume37
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.

Keywords

  • Bin packing
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Pareto optimality
  • Selfish players

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
  • Control and Optimization
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

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