Outsourcing public service delivery: Management responses in noncompetitive markets

Amanda M. Girth, Amir Hefetz, Jocelyn M. Johnston, Mildred E. Warner

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/Debate

Abstract

Capturing the benefits of competition is a key argument for outsourcing public services, yet public service markets often lack sufficient competition. The authors use survey and interview data from U.S. local governments to explore the responses of public managers to noncompetitive markets. This research indicates that competition is weak in most local government markets (fewer than two alternative providers on average across 67 services measured), and that the relationship between competition and contracting choice varies by service type. Public managers respond to suboptimal market competition by intervening with strategies designed to create, sustain, and enhance provider markets. In monopoly service markets, managers are more likely to use intergovernmental contracting, while for-profit contracting is more common in more competitive service markets. The strategies that public managers employ to build and sustain competition for contracts often require tangible investments of administrative resources that add to the transaction costs of contracting in noncompetitive markets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)887-900
Number of pages14
JournalPublic Administration Review
Volume72
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

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