On the quality and complexity of pareto equilibria in the job scheduling game

Leah Epstein, Elena Kleiman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

In the well-known scheduling game, a set of jobs controlled by selfish players wishes each to minimize the load of the machine on which it is executed, while the social goal is to minimize the makespan, that is, the maximum load of any machine. We consider this problem on the three most common machines models, identical machines, uniformly related machines and unrelated machines, with respect to both weak and strict Pareto optimal Nash equilibria. These are kinds of equilibria which are stable not only in the sense that no player can improve its cost by changing its strategy unilaterally, but in addition, there is no alternative choice of strategies for the entire set of players where no player increases its cost, and at least one player reduces its cost (in the case of strict Pareto optimality), or where all players reduce their costs (in the case of weak Pareto optimality). We give a complete classification of the social quality of such solutions with respect to an optimal solution, that is, we find the Price of Anarchy of such schedules as a function of the number of machines, m. In addition, we give a full classification of the recognition complexity of such schedules. Categories and Subject Descriptors K.6.0 [Management of Computing and information Systems]: General-Economics; F.2.2 [Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems]: [Sequencing and scheduling] General Terms Algorithms, Economics, Theory.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProc. of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AA- MAS’11)
Pages489-496
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 2011
Event10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: 2 May 20116 May 2011

Conference

Conference10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2011, AAMAS 2011
Country/TerritoryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period2/05/116/05/11

Keywords

  • Economic paradigms
  • Economically-motivated agents
  • Game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative)
  • Lob scheduling
  • Price of anarchy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence

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