On the difficulty of extending the coco value to games with more than two players

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.07.004

On the difficulty of extending the coco value to games with more than two players

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Kalai and Kalai (2013) presented five axioms for solutions of 2-person semi-cooperative games: games in which the basic data specifies individual strategies and payoffs, but in which the players can sign binding contracts and make utility transfers. The axioms pin down a unique solution, the coco value. I show that if one adds a mild dummy player axiom to the list, then the axioms become inconsistent when there are more than two players.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	363-365
Number of pages	3
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	47
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.07.004
State	Published - Sep 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Coco value
Impossibility
Semi-cooperative games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.orl.2019.07.004

Cite this

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abstract = "Kalai and Kalai (2013) presented five axioms for solutions of 2-person semi-cooperative games: games in which the basic data specifies individual strategies and payoffs, but in which the players can sign binding contracts and make utility transfers. The axioms pin down a unique solution, the coco value. I show that if one adds a mild dummy player axiom to the list, then the axioms become inconsistent when there are more than two players.",

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KW - Impossibility

KW - Semi-cooperative games

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On the difficulty of extending the coco value to games with more than two players

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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