Poster: On the anonymity of Israel's general elections

Tomer Ashur, Orr Dunkelman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

This work presents an attack on the privacy of some voting systems. We show that by combining information from several sources, some of it publicly available, and some of it can be easily collected ad-hoc, an adversary can greatly reduce the size of a voter's anonymity set. In many cases the obtained information is sufficient to deduce the content of a vote (or approximate a small set of possible values). As a test case, we present this attack in the context of the Israeli general parliamentary elections. Simulations we ran show that we can successfully determine the value of about 50% of the votes after observing three election systems.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCCS 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Pages1399-1401
Number of pages3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2013 - Berlin, Germany
Duration: 4 Nov 20138 Nov 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Conference

Conference2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2013
Country/TerritoryGermany
CityBerlin
Period4/11/138/11/13

Keywords

  • intersection attack
  • israel's elections
  • privacy
  • voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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