On the alleged perversity of the evidential view of testimony

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According to the evidential view of testimony (EVT), the epistemic value of testimony is its value as evidence. Richard Moran has argued that because testimony is deliberately produced with the intention of making audiences form a belief, its value as evidence for the attested proposition is diminished; as a result, EVT cannot explain why we regard testimony as such a significant source of knowledge. I argue that this argument against EVT fails, because there is no reason to think that the deliberate nature of testimony diminishes its value as evidence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)700-707
Number of pages8
Issue number4
StatePublished - 2012


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