On equilibria for ADM minimization games

Leah Epstein, Asaf Levin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In theADMminimization problem the input is a set of arcs along a directed ring. The input arcs need to be partitioned into non-overlapping chains and cycles so as to minimize the total number of endpoints, where a k-arc cycle contributes k endpoints and a k-arc chain contains k + 1 endpoints. We study ADM minimization problem both as non-cooperative and cooperative games. In these games each arc corresponds to a player, and the players share the cost of the ADM switches. We consider two cost allocation models, a model which was considered by Flammini et al., and a new cost allocation model, which is inspired by congestion games. We compare the price of anarchy and price of stability in the two cost allocation models, as well as the strong price of anarchy and the strong price of stability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)246-273
Number of pages28
Issue number1-2
StatePublished - Jun 2012


  • ADM minimization
  • Local search heuristics
  • Worst case analysis

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Computer Science
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Applied Mathematics


Dive into the research topics of 'On equilibria for ADM minimization games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this