On equilibria for ADM minimization games

Leah Epstein, Asaf Levin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


In the ADM minimization problem, the input is a set of arcs along a directed ring. The input arcs need to be partitioned into non-overlapping chains and cycles so as to minimize the total number of endpoints, where a k-arc cycle contributes k endpoints and a k-arc chain contains k+1 endpoints. We study ADM minimization problem both as a non-cooperative and a cooperative games. In these games, each arc corresponds to a player, and the players share the cost of the ADM switches. We consider two cost allocation models, a model which was considered by Flammini et al., and a new cost allocation model, which is inspired by congestion games. We compare the price of anarchy and price of stability in the two cost allocation models, as well as the strong price of anarchy and the strong price of stability.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings
Number of pages12
StatePublished - 2009
Event2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009 - Paphos, Cyprus
Duration: 18 Oct 200920 Oct 2009

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5814 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science


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