As I have claimed in the past, we live in the heroic age of free will philosophy: more new good ideas and arguments have been presented, and more philosophical progress made in the last 60 years than since the problem was recognized, some 2,000 years ago. As we shall soon see, the free will problem is actually a conjunction of ve questions or problems; the last three were hardly recognized before 1960. This truly outstanding progress can be divided into two types: the larger body of work consists of the greater understanding and sophistication of what can be described as the ‘standard’ views. A much smaller but still not insubstantial body of work has been developed in what can be described as ‘nonstandard views.’ In this chapter. I will review some of the fascinating developments in the nonstandard direction.
|Title of host publication||The Routledge Companion to Free Will|
|Editors||Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy|
|Place of Publication||New York|
|Number of pages||11|
|State||Published - 2 Dec 2016|