No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1007/s00355-020-01302-x

No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A bargaining solution satisfies no individual priorities (NIP) if the following holds: if x is the selected utility allocation and πx is also feasible, where π is some permutation, then x= πx. I characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the basis of this axiom, non-triviality (the disagreement point is never selected), and scale covariance. An additional characterization is presented for the 2-person case, in which NIP is weakened and symmetry is added.

Original language	English
Article number	4
Pages (from-to)	855-863
Number of pages	9
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	56
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01302-x
State	Published - May 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00355-020-01302-x

Cite this

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No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution

Abstract

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