New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity

Muhammad Barham; Orr Dunkelman; Stefan Lucks; Marc Stevens

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_14

New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity

Muhammad Barham, Orr Dunkelman, Stefan Lucks, Marc Stevens

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Dithered hash functions were proposed by Rivest as a method to mitigate second preimage attacks on Merkle-Damgård hash functions. Despite that, second preimage attacks against dithered hash functions were proposed by Andreeva et al., One issue with these second preimage attacks is their huge memory requirement in the precomputation and the online phases. In this paper, we present new second preimage attacks on the dithered Merkle-Damgård construction. These attacks consume significantly less memory in the online phase (with a negligible increase in the online time complexity) than previous attacks. For example, in the case of MD5 with the Keränen sequence, we reduce the memory complexity from about blocks to about (about 545, MB). We also present an essentially memoryless variant of Andreeva et al., attack. In case of MD5-Keränen or SHA1-Keränen, the offline and online memory complexity is message blocks (about 188–235, KB), at the expense of increasing the offline time complexity.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2016 - 23rd International Conference, Revised Selected Papers
Editors	Roberto Avanzi, Howard Heys
Publisher	Springer Verlag
Pages	247-263
Number of pages	17
ISBN (Print)	9783319694528
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_14
State	Published - 2017
Event	23rd International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC 2016 - St. John's, Canada Duration: 10 Aug 2016 → 12 Aug 2016

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	10532 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	23rd International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC 2016
Country/Territory	Canada
City	St. John's
Period	10/08/16 → 12/08/16

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, Springer International Publishing AG.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_14

Cite this

Barham, M., Dunkelman, O., Lucks, S., & Stevens, M. (2017). New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity. In R. Avanzi, & H. Heys (Eds.), Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2016 - 23rd International Conference, Revised Selected Papers (pp. 247-263). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10532 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_14

Barham, Muhammad ; Dunkelman, Orr ; Lucks, Stefan et al. / New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity. Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2016 - 23rd International Conference, Revised Selected Papers. editor / Roberto Avanzi ; Howard Heys. Springer Verlag, 2017. pp. 247-263 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity",

abstract = "Dithered hash functions were proposed by Rivest as a method to mitigate second preimage attacks on Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd hash functions. Despite that, second preimage attacks against dithered hash functions were proposed by Andreeva et al., One issue with these second preimage attacks is their huge memory requirement in the precomputation and the online phases. In this paper, we present new second preimage attacks on the dithered Merkle-Damg{\aa}rd construction. These attacks consume significantly less memory in the online phase (with a negligible increase in the online time complexity) than previous attacks. For example, in the case of MD5 with the Ker{\"a}nen sequence, we reduce the memory complexity from about blocks to about (about 545, MB). We also present an essentially memoryless variant of Andreeva et al., attack. In case of MD5-Ker{\"a}nen or SHA1-Ker{\"a}nen, the offline and online memory complexity is message blocks (about 188–235, KB), at the expense of increasing the offline time complexity.",

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Barham, M, Dunkelman, O, Lucks, S & Stevens, M 2017, New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity. in R Avanzi & H Heys (eds), Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2016 - 23rd International Conference, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 10532 LNCS, Springer Verlag, pp. 247-263, 23rd International Conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography, SAC 2016, St. John's, Canada, 10/08/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_14

New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity. / Barham, Muhammad; Dunkelman, Orr; Lucks, Stefan et al.
Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2016 - 23rd International Conference, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Roberto Avanzi; Howard Heys. Springer Verlag, 2017. p. 247-263 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 10532 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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N2 - Dithered hash functions were proposed by Rivest as a method to mitigate second preimage attacks on Merkle-Damgård hash functions. Despite that, second preimage attacks against dithered hash functions were proposed by Andreeva et al., One issue with these second preimage attacks is their huge memory requirement in the precomputation and the online phases. In this paper, we present new second preimage attacks on the dithered Merkle-Damgård construction. These attacks consume significantly less memory in the online phase (with a negligible increase in the online time complexity) than previous attacks. For example, in the case of MD5 with the Keränen sequence, we reduce the memory complexity from about blocks to about (about 545, MB). We also present an essentially memoryless variant of Andreeva et al., attack. In case of MD5-Keränen or SHA1-Keränen, the offline and online memory complexity is message blocks (about 188–235, KB), at the expense of increasing the offline time complexity.

AB - Dithered hash functions were proposed by Rivest as a method to mitigate second preimage attacks on Merkle-Damgård hash functions. Despite that, second preimage attacks against dithered hash functions were proposed by Andreeva et al., One issue with these second preimage attacks is their huge memory requirement in the precomputation and the online phases. In this paper, we present new second preimage attacks on the dithered Merkle-Damgård construction. These attacks consume significantly less memory in the online phase (with a negligible increase in the online time complexity) than previous attacks. For example, in the case of MD5 with the Keränen sequence, we reduce the memory complexity from about blocks to about (about 545, MB). We also present an essentially memoryless variant of Andreeva et al., attack. In case of MD5-Keränen or SHA1-Keränen, the offline and online memory complexity is message blocks (about 188–235, KB), at the expense of increasing the offline time complexity.

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Barham M, Dunkelman O, Lucks S, Stevens M. New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity. In Avanzi R, Heys H, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2016 - 23rd International Conference, Revised Selected Papers. Springer Verlag. 2017. p. 247-263. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-69453-5_14

New Second Preimage Attacks on Dithered Hash Functions with Low Memory Complexity

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Bibliographical note

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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