Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.007

Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I axiomatize the n-person asymmetric Nash bargaining solution on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, feasible set continuity, and conflict-freeness-the requirement that the solution selects the ideal point whenever it is feasible to do so.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	107-109
Number of pages	3
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	76
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.007
State	Published - 1 Jul 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V..

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.007

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Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality

Abstract

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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