Nash bargaining with (almost) no rationality

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I axiomatize the n-person asymmetric Nash bargaining solution on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, feasible set continuity, and conflict-freeness-the requirement that the solution selects the ideal point whenever it is feasible to do so.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-109
Number of pages3
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V..

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • General Social Sciences
  • General Psychology
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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