Multi-sided advertising markets: Dynamic mechanisms and incremental user compensations

Moran Feldman, Gonen Frim, Rica Gonen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Online advertising has motivated companies to collect vast amounts of information about users, which increasingly creates privacy concerns. One way to answer these concerns is by enabling end users to choose which aspects of their private information can be collected. Based on principles suggested by Feldman and Gonen (2018), we introduce a new online advertising market model which uses information brokers to give users such control. Unlike Feldman and Gonen (2018), our model is dynamic and involves multi-sided markets where all participating sides are strategic. We describe a mechanism for this model which is theoretically guaranteed to (approximately) maximize the gain from trade, avoid a budget deficit and incentivize truthfulness and voluntary participation. As far as we know, this is the first known dynamic mechanism for a multi-sided market having these properties. We experimentally examine and compare our theoretical results using real world advertising bid data. The experiments suggest that our mechanism performs well in practice even in regimes for which our theoretical guarantee is weak or irrelevant.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings
EditorsLinda Bushnell, Radha Poovendran, Tamer Basar
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages227-247
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)9783030015534
DOIs
StatePublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes
Event9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018 - Seattle, United States
Duration: 29 Oct 201831 Oct 2018

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11199 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySeattle
Period29/10/1831/10/18

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Keywords

  • Dynamic mechanisms
  • Mutli-sided markets
  • Online advertising market

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science (all)

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