Abstract
Public payers often use payment mechanisms as a way to improve the efficiency of the healthcare system. One source of inefficiency is service distortion (SD) in which health plans over/underprovide services in order to affect the mix of their enrollees. Using Israeli data, we apply a new measure of SD to show that a mixed payment scheme, with a modest level of cost-sharing, yields a significant improvement over a pure risk-adjustment scheme. This observation implies that even though mixed systems induce overprovision of some services, their benefits far outweigh their costs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1359-1374 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | European Journal of Health Economics |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 9 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Dec 2019 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Risk-Adjustment Network Workshop held in October 2016 in Berlin, Germany. The authors are especially grateful to Konstantin Beck, Randall Ellis, Timothy Layton, Thomas McGuire, Amir Shmueli, Wynand Van de Ven, Richard Van Kleef, and other participants in the workshop for their helpful comments and advice. The authors are also grateful to Glied Sherry, Altman Stuart, Freed Gary and Wittenberg Raphael for their constructive suggestions. This study was funded by a Grant provided by the Israel National Institute for Health Policy Research (Grant number 2012/37).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
Keywords
- Adverse selection
- Capitation
- Managed care
- Managed competition
- Payment mechanisms
- Risk-adjustment
- Risk-sharing
- Service distortion
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
- Health Policy
