Abstract
In July 1535, the trial of Sir Thomas More took place, in which the ex-Lord Chancellor was accused, and found guilty, of high treason for not expressing support for two statutes passed in 1534, which formed the basis of Henry VIII's constitutional and religious changes: the Act of Succession and the Act of Supremacy. One of the stipulations was the requirement for people to take an oath in support of these changes. More refused to take the oath, arguing that according to the literal interpretation of the statutes he could be found guilty of misprision [concealment] of treason only, and not of treason itself. However, it will be argued, More misunderstood-or refused to understand-the ultimate purpose of the statutes, which may stem from his being a lawyer: he gave the statute a literal interpretation and ignored extralinguistic information, since such information does not play a role in interpretation, unless a literal interpretation would not make sense in the context (a possible precursor of Heydon's Case of 1584).
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Legal Pragmatics |
Editors | Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky, Dennis Kurzon |
Publisher | John Benjamins Publishing Company |
Pages | 81-97 |
Number of pages | 17 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9789027200716 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2018 |
Publication series
Name | Pragmatics and Beyond New Series |
---|---|
Volume | 288 |
ISSN (Print) | 0922-842X |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2018 John Benjamins Publishing Company.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Language and Linguistics
- Linguistics and Language