Informative tests in signaling environments

Ran Weksler, Boaz Zik

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the informativeness of signaling in the equilibrium that a test induces depends on the relative informativeness of the test's high and low grades. Consequently, we find that the receiver's preference relation over tests needs not comply with Blackwell's (1951) order. Our findings may shed light on phenomena such as grade inflation and information coarsening.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)977-1006
Number of pages30
JournalTheoretical Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2022 The Authors.


  • C72
  • D82
  • D83
  • Signaling games
  • information design
  • strategic information transmission
  • strategic learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)


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