Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

Avi Lichtig; Ran Weksler

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2023.105653

Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

Avi Lichtig, Ran Weksler

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication environments, the answer is positive. If the sender's evidence is more Blackwell informative, then the receiver's equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell-ordered set does so efficiently.

Original language	English
Article number	105653
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	210
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105653
State	Published - Jun 2023

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
For their valuable comments and advice, we sincerely thank Elchanan Ben-Porath, Gregorio Curello, Sivan Frenkel, Claudia Herresthal, Mathijs Janssen, Daniel Krähmer, Ilan Kremer, Helene Mass, Benny Moldovanu, Franz Ostrizek, Amnon Schreiber, Mark Whitmeyer, and Boaz Zik. Lichtig acknowledges funding by the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (Project B01 ).

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

Evidence
Informativeness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2023.105653

Cite this

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title = "Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games",

abstract = "Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication environments, the answer is positive. If the sender's evidence is more Blackwell informative, then the receiver's equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell-ordered set does so efficiently.",

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Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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