Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication environments, the answer is positive. If the sender's evidence is more Blackwell informative, then the receiver's equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell-ordered set does so efficiently.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
For their valuable comments and advice, we sincerely thank Elchanan Ben-Porath, Gregorio Curello, Sivan Frenkel, Claudia Herresthal, Mathijs Janssen, Daniel Krähmer, Ilan Kremer, Helene Mass, Benny Moldovanu, Franz Ostrizek, Amnon Schreiber, Mark Whitmeyer, and Boaz Zik. Lichtig acknowledges funding by the German Research Foundation (DFG) through CRC TR 224 (Project B01 ).
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics