We focus on a class of linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products and prove that whether there is an information advantage or disadvantage depends on firms' information setup. Specifically, we show that when the cross-effects are common value, the uninformed firm that commits to quantity will not have lower ex ante profits than a firm that has complete information about its cross-effects. This result contrasts to the information advantage that holds in the same duopolies with independent cross-effects.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We thank S. Anderson (Editor) and two referees for very constructive suggestions. The research of Chokler and Shitovitz was supported by the Israel Science Foundation.
- Cournot duopolies
- Information disadvantage
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Industrial relations
- Aerospace Engineering
- Economics and Econometrics
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
- Strategy and Management
- Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering