Information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments: Evidence from subjective confidence

Asher Koriat, Ravit Nussinson, Herbert Bless, Nira Shaked

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


Dual-process theories have been very influential in social psychology and cognitive psychology. These theories postulate a distinction between two modes of thought that underlie judgment and behavior (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Different labels have been proposed to describe the two modes (see Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004): nonanalytic versus analytic (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984), associative versus rule based (Sloman, 1996), impulsive versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), experiential versus rational (Epstein & Pacini, 1999), and heuristic versus systematic (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Although each of these labels emphasizes different aspects of the distinction, there is a general agreement that one mode of thought is fast, automatic, effortless, and implicit, whereas the other is slow, deliberate, effortful, and consciously monitored. Several researchers preferred to use the labels proposed by Stanovich and West (2000), System 1 versus System 2, which are more neutral.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHandbook of Metamemory and Memory
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9781136648557
ISBN (Print)9780805862140
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2013

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Psychology


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