Abstract
The question of whether extraterrestrials exist has driven both the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) and some attempts of messaging to extraterrestrial intelligence (METI). Nevertheless, no data-driven or theory-based behavioural policy has been suggested. Here we simulate a comprehensive set of human–extraterrestrial strategic interactions, modelled as two-by-two game-theoretic matrices. We examine a sample of possible outcomes by relying on the theory of subjective expected relative similarity (SERS), which takes into account both the expected payoffs and the extent of strategic similarity – the prospects of the opponent making identical choices. Simulation results suggest: focusing messaging efforts on signalling of complete strategic similarity, monitoring potential alien communications for similarity-indicating signals, and using risk-averse decision rules for policy planning and decision-making. The discussion puts forward three guidelines for METI initiatives and addresses the relevance of the findings to human conflict management.
Original language | English |
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Article number | e21 |
Journal | International Journal of Astrobiology |
Volume | 23 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 17 Oct 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press.
Keywords
- behavioural game-theory
- conflict management
- cooperation
- extraterrestrials
- METI
- SETI
- similarity
- strategic decision-making
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
- Physics and Astronomy (miscellaneous)
- Space and Planetary Science
- Earth and Planetary Sciences (miscellaneous)