How social media can undermine democracy

Ronen Gradwohl, Yuval Heller, Arye Hillman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We examine the influence a self-interested social-media platform can have on election outcomes. Using the framework of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we explore the effect of additional information via private messages from the platform, modeled through Bayesian persuasion. We establish conditions under which the platform can sway the majority voting outcome, assuming voters vote sincerely. Additionally, we demonstrate that the information disseminated by the platform can sometimes be biased in the opposite direction of the platform's interests.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102634
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume86
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2025

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

  • Ideology
  • Media bias
  • Political persuasion
  • Social media
  • Voter information

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

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