Abstract
We investigate derandomizations of digital good randomized auctions. We propose a general derandomization method which can be used to show that for every random auction there exists a deterministic auction having asymptotically the same revenue. In addition, we construct an explicit optimal deterministic auction for bi-valued auctions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 478-493 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Random Structures and Algorithms |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 May 2015 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Keywords
- Bi-valued auctions
- Derandomizing auctions
- Digital good auctions
- Hat games
- Unlimited supply auctions
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- General Mathematics
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Applied Mathematics