Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

This article presents a novel position on the issue of free will and compares this position to other more familiar ones. It consists of two radical theses: fundamental dualism and illusionism. Part 1 presents the three questions on the issue of free will and then briefly states reasons that libertarian free will is impossible, and hence reasons that we need to be concerned with compatibilism and hard determinism. Part 2 sets out the first of the two radical proposals, a fundamental dualism according to which we have to be both compatibilists and hard determinists. Part 3 presents the second proposal, illusionism, which claims that illusion on free will is morally necessary.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Free Will
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780199995462
ISBN (Print)0195178548, 9780195178548
DOIs
StatePublished - 2 Sep 2009

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2002 by Robert Hilary Kane. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Fundamental dualism
  • Hard determinism
  • Illusionism
  • Incompatibilist
  • Libertarian free will
  • Moral responsibility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Arts and Humanities

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