This article's view is unusual among contemporary views of free will. It is defined by two radical theses. The first, Fundamental Dualism, says that we can and should be both incompatibilists and compatibilists about freedom and responsibility. There is no reason, the article argues, why it should not be the case that certain forms of moral responsibility, desert, and blame require libertarian free will, whereas other forms can be sustained without it. Thus, if libertarian free will is impossible, there is no reason why we have to choose between hard determinism or compatibilism. The second thesis, Illusionism, is even more radical. It notes that the consequences for humanity of widespread belief that we lack libertarian free will would be dire and destructive. Illusion about free will is therefore morally necessary.
|Title of host publication||The Oxford Handbook of Free Will|
|Subtitle of host publication||Second Edition|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|State||Published - 18 Sep 2012|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© 2011 by Oxford University Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
- Fundamental dualism
- Hard determinism
- Libertarian free will
- Moral responsibility
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities (all)