Explaining great power cooperation in conflict management

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-46
Number of pages46
JournalWorld Politics
Issue number1
StatePublished - Oct 1992
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* Research and writing of an early draft of this article were supported by the Olin Fellowship of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, and by a postdoctoral fellowship of the Defense and Arms Control Program of the MIT Center for International Studies. Additional funding was provided by research grants of the U.S. Institute of Peace and by the Davis Institute for International Relations, the Hebrew University. For comments on earlier versions of this essay, I would like to thank Mike Desch, Michael Doyle, Yair Evron, Reuven Gal, Alexander George, Catherine Gjerdingen, Peter Katzenstein, Chaim Kaufmann, Ronnie Lipschutz, Clay Moltz, Barry Posen, Robert Powell, Ed Rhodes, Jonathan Shimshoni, Roger Smith, Saadia Touval, Stephen Van Evera, Kenneth Waltz, and Steve Weber. For comments on later drafts, I would like to thank Emanuel Adler, Uri Bar-[oseph, Raymond Cohen, Korina Kagan, and Zeev Maoz. The author alone is, of course, responsible for the contents of this essay. 1On deductive reasoning for the stability of bipolar systems, see Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus 93 (1964); idem, Theory ofInternational Politics (Read-

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this