Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: An Argument for Anti-Nihilism: An Argument for Anti-Nihilism

Samuel Lebens, Tyron Goldschmidt

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Could there have been no concrete beings? Could there have been no contingent beings? If there could have been no such beings, why then are there any? This chapter argues that various modal metaphysics rule out the possibility of there being nothing at all. It concludes that the most prominent pictures of the nature of possibility entail the existence of something, and thus answer the question of why there is something rather than nothing.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationNon-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence
Subtitle of host publicationNew Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence
Editors Sara Bernstein, Tyron Goldschmidt
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages188-202
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9780198846222
ISBN (Print)9780198846222
DOIs
StatePublished - 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© the several contributors 2021.

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