Equivalence theorem for the core of a duopolistic market game with concave utilities

Benyamin Shitovitz

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(94)90039-6

Equivalence theorem for the core of a duopolistic market game with concave utilities

Benyamin Shitovitz

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We prove here that duopolistic market's core coincides with the associated split (atomless) market's core even when these sets are not guaranteed to coincide with the competitive allocations. In a small way, this result makes the counter intuitive Theorem B of Shitovitz (1973) easier to understand.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	101-106
Number of pages	6
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	23
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90039-6
State	Published - Jan 1994

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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abstract = "We prove here that duopolistic market's core coincides with the associated split (atomless) market's core even when these sets are not guaranteed to coincide with the competitive allocations. In a small way, this result makes the counter intuitive Theorem B of Shitovitz (1973) easier to understand.",

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Equivalence theorem for the core of a duopolistic market game with concave utilities

Abstract

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