Abstract
We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 241-245 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| Volume | 61 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Dec 2015 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2015 Elsevier B.V.
Keywords
- Equilibrium existence
- Incomplete information
- Tullock contests
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Applied Mathematics
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