Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

E. Einy; O. Haimanko; D. Moreno; A. Sela; B. Shitovitz

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.004

Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

E. Einy, O. Haimanko, D. Moreno, A. Sela, B. Shitovitz

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	241-245
Number of pages	5
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	61
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.004
State	Published - 1 Dec 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Equilibrium existence
Incomplete information
Tullock contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.004

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@article{8b05e18e95c14243a270047aa6982268,

title = "Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information",

abstract = "We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.",

keywords = "Equilibrium existence, Incomplete information, Tullock contests",

author = "E. Einy and O. Haimanko and D. Moreno and A. Sela and B. Shitovitz",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2015",

month = dec,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.004",

language = "English",

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T1 - Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

AU - Einy, E.

AU - Haimanko, O.

AU - Moreno, D.

AU - Sela, A.

AU - Shitovitz, B.

PY - 2015/12/1

Y1 - 2015/12/1

N2 - We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.

AB - We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.

KW - Equilibrium existence

KW - Incomplete information

KW - Tullock contests

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U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.004

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84948744869

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 61

SP - 241

EP - 245

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

ER -

Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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