Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information

E. Einy, O. Haimanko, D. Moreno, A. Sela, B. Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We prove an existence theorem for pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Tullock contests where the information endowment of each contender is described by a countable partition.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-245
Number of pages5
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V.


  • Equilibrium existence
  • Incomplete information
  • Tullock contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


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