Abstract
Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model where the customers incur not only congestion (waiting) costs but also penalties for their index of arrival. Arriving before other customers is desirable when the value of service decreases with every admitted customer. This may be the case for example when arriving at a concert or a bus with unmarked seats or going to lunch in a busy cafeteria. We provide game theoretic analysis of such queueing systems with a given number of customers, specifically we characterize the arrival process which constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 456-468 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | European Journal of Operational Research |
| Volume | 239 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Dec 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The author would like to thank Moshe Haviv, Binyamin Oz, Refael Hassin and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and advice throughout this work. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 1319/11 and the Center for the Study of Rationality in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem .
Keywords
- Queueing
- Queueing games
- Strategic arrival times to a queue
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Computer Science
- Modeling and Simulation
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Information Systems and Management