Enlarged cores and bargaining schemes in games with fuzzy coalitions

Dan Butnariu; Tomáš Kroupa

doi:10.1016/j.fss.2008.06.001

Enlarged cores and bargaining schemes in games with fuzzy coalitions

Dan Butnariu, Tomáš Kroupa

Department of Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new concept of solution for games with fuzzy coalitions, which we call an enlarged core. The enlarged core captures an idea that various groups of fuzzy coalitions can have different bargaining power or influence on the final distribution of wealth resulting from the cooperation process. We study a bargaining scheme for the enlarged core, which is an iterative procedure for generating sequences converging to elements of the enlarged core. It is shown that the enlarged core coincides with Aubin's core for a specific class of games with fuzzy coalitions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	635-643
Number of pages	9
Journal	Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Volume	160
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fss.2008.06.001
State	Published - 1 Mar 2009

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
The authors are grateful to Prof. Milan Mareš for making their cooperation possible. The work of Tomáš Kroupa was supported by Grant no. 1M0572 of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic and by Grant GA Cˇ R 102/08/0567.

Keywords

Bargaining schemes
Core
Games with fuzzy coalitions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Logic
Artificial Intelligence

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.fss.2008.06.001

Cite this

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AU - Kroupa, Tomáš

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Enlarged cores and bargaining schemes in games with fuzzy coalitions

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

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