In this paper we introduce a new concept of solution for games with fuzzy coalitions, which we call an enlarged core. The enlarged core captures an idea that various groups of fuzzy coalitions can have different bargaining power or influence on the final distribution of wealth resulting from the cooperation process. We study a bargaining scheme for the enlarged core, which is an iterative procedure for generating sequences converging to elements of the enlarged core. It is shown that the enlarged core coincides with Aubin's core for a specific class of games with fuzzy coalitions.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The authors are grateful to Prof. Milan Mareš for making their cooperation possible. The work of Tomáš Kroupa was supported by Grant no. 1M0572 of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic and by Grant GA Cˇ R 102/08/0567.
- Bargaining schemes
- Games with fuzzy coalitions
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence