Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.004

Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1714-1725
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	148
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.004
State	Published - Jul 2013

Keywords

Auctions
Bid rotation
Collusion
Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.004

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title = "Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions",

abstract = "I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.",

keywords = "Auctions, Bid rotation, Collusion, Repeated games",

author = "Shiran Rachmilevitch",

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language = "English",

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KW - Collusion

KW - Repeated games

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Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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