Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1714-1725
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number4
StatePublished - Jul 2013


  • Auctions
  • Bid rotation
  • Collusion
  • Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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