Abstract
For every 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution selects a point that is “between” the relative (or normalized) utilitarian point and the relative egalitarian (i.e., Kalai–Smorodinsky) point. Also, it is “between” the (non-normalized) utilitarian and egalitarian points. I improve these bounds. I also derive a new characterization of the Nash solution which combines a bounds property together with strong individual rationality and an axiom which is new to Nash’s bargaining model, the sandwich axiom. The sandwich axiom is a weakening of Nash’s IIA.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 427-442 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Theory and Decision |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Mar 2016 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2015, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Bounds
- Egalitarianism
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sandwich axiom
- Utilitarianism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Decision Sciences
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
- Applied Psychology
- General Social Sciences
- General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
- Computer Science Applications