For every 2-person bargaining problem, the Nash bargaining solution selects a point that is “between” the relative (or normalized) utilitarian point and the relative egalitarian (i.e., Kalai–Smorodinsky) point. Also, it is “between” the (non-normalized) utilitarian and egalitarian points. I improve these bounds. I also derive a new characterization of the Nash solution which combines a bounds property together with strong individual rationality and an axiom which is new to Nash’s bargaining model, the sandwich axiom. The sandwich axiom is a weakening of Nash’s IIA.
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© 2015, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sandwich axiom
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Decision Sciences (all)
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
- Applied Psychology
- Social Sciences (all)
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
- Computer Science Applications