A bargaining solution satisfies egalitarian–utilitarian monotonicity (EUM) if the following holds under feasible-set-expansion: a decrease in the value of the Rawlsian (resp. utilitarian) objective is accompanied by an increase in the value of the utilitarian (resp. Rawlsian) objective. A bargaining solution is welfarist if it maximizes a symmetric and strictly concave social welfare function. Every 2-person welfarist solution satisfies EUM, but for n≥ 3 every n-person welfarist solution violates it. In the presence of other standard axioms, EUM characterizes the Nash solution in the 2-person case, but leads to impossibility in the n-person case.
|Number of pages||11|
|Journal||Social Choice and Welfare|
|State||Published - 1 Apr 2019|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics