Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution

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A bargaining solution satisfies egalitarian–utilitarian monotonicity (EUM) if the following holds under feasible-set-expansion: a decrease in the value of the Rawlsian (resp. utilitarian) objective is accompanied by an increase in the value of the utilitarian (resp. Rawlsian) objective. A bargaining solution is welfarist if it maximizes a symmetric and strictly concave social welfare function. Every 2-person welfarist solution satisfies EUM, but for n≥ 3 every n-person welfarist solution violates it. In the presence of other standard axioms, EUM characterizes the Nash solution in the 2-person case, but leads to impossibility in the n-person case.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)741-751
Number of pages11
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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