It is commonly maintained that neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain provide empirical support for the hypothesis of multiple realizability. We show in various case studies that neuroplasticity stems from preexisting mechanisms and processes inherent in the neural (or biochemical) structure of the brain. We argue that not only does neuroplasticity fail to provide empirical evidence of multiple realization, its inability to do so strengthens the mind-body identity theory. Finally, we argue that a recently proposed identity theory called Flat Physicalism can be enlisted to explain the current state of the mind-body problem more adequately.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
1 We thank Orly Shenker (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) for continuing discussions of the mind-body identity theory. We also thank the participants in the philosophy of physics and philosophy of mind seminars at the University of Haifa and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (ISF), grant number: 1148/18.
© The Author(s), 2022.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History and Philosophy of Science