Discounting-sensitivity in symmetric repeated games: An example

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I present an example of a symmetric repeated game in which an arbitrarily small change in the discount factor can lead to a discontinuous change in the level of symmetry that can be sustained in equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-3
Number of pages3
JournalOperations Research Letters
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.


  • Repeated games
  • Symmetric equilibrium
  • Symmetric games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics


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