Abstract
Denialism on free will and moral responsibility combines, in its minimal version, non-libertarianism (the claim that there is no libertarian free will and hence no LFW-based moral responsibility), with incompatibilism (the rejection of free will and moral responsibility that are compatible with the absence of LFW). A broader version of denialism adds the ideas of the awfulness of the status quo, namely, that the belief in free will and moral responsibility and the connected reactions and practices are, all considered, extremely harmful; the viability of alternatives to these beliefs and practices; and the conclusion that we should, all considered, aim to bring about a radical change, and to live without the beliefs, attitudes and practices which assume libertarian or compatibilist senses of free will and moral responsibility. This chapter explains the issues and considers the merits of the broader version of denialism.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | A Companion to Free Will |
Publisher | wiley |
Pages | 184-203 |
Number of pages | 20 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781119210177 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781119210139 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 13 Jun 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2023 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Keywords
- Compatibilism
- Denialism
- Free will
- Incompatibilism
- Moral responsibility
- P.F. Strawson
- Punishment
- Social change
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Arts and Humanities