Decentralized advice

Timothy Feddersen; Ronen Gradwohl

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101871

Decentralized advice

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.

Original language	English
Article number	101871
Journal	European Journal of Political Economy
Volume	63
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101871
State	Published - Jun 2020
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Advice
Cheap talk
Transparency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Political Science and International Relations

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10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101871

Cite this

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title = "Decentralized advice",

abstract = "We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.",

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author = "Timothy Feddersen and Ronen Gradwohl",

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AB - We compare the amount of information credibly transmitted by cheap talk when information is centralized to one sender and when it is decentralized, with each of several senders holding a distinct but interdependent piece. Under centralization, full information transmission is typically impossible. Under decentralization, however, the number of receivers is decisive: decentralized communication with one receiver is completely uninformative, but decentralized communication with multiple receivers can be fully informative. We analyze the extent of such fully-informative communication, and apply our results to the issue of transparency in advisory committees.

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KW - Transparency

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Decentralized advice

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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