Abstract
We investigate a class of agency costs of debt that arise because debt financing affects the firm's incentives to use inputs efficiently. A methodology for estimating this class of costs is presented and applied to a major industry, air transport. Our results are consistent with agency models that predict a decrease in efficiency as the debt increases. A part of the loss of efficiency that we identify is attributable to the greater use by levered firms of inputs that can be monitored and are collateralizable. 1990 The American Finance Association
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 795-816 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Journal of Finance |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 1990 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics