Countermeasures against differential power analysis for hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems

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Abstract

In this paper we describe some countermeasures against differential side-channel attacks on hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems. The techniques are modelled on the corresponding ones for elliptic curves. The first method consists in picking a random group isomorphic to the one where we are supposed to compute, transferring the computation to the random group and then pulling the result back. The second method consists in altering the internal representation of the divisors on the curve in a random way. The impact of the recent attack of L. Goubin is assessed and ways to avoid it are proposed.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
EditorsColin D. Walter, Cetin K. Koc, Christof Paar
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages366-381
Number of pages16
ISBN (Print)3540408339, 9783540408338
DOIs
StatePublished - 2003
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2779
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Keywords

  • Differential power analysis (DPA)
  • Hyperelliptic curves
  • Public-key cryptography
  • Side-channel attacks
  • Smart cards
  • Timing attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science (all)

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