Abstract
In this note a partial solution of Open Problem 41C of Aumann and Shapley [1974, pp. 250-251] is presented. A sufficient condition for the Aumann-Shapley value of a market game to exist, to be contained in its core, and to be the competitive payoff distribution of a transferable utility competitive equilibrium is given. In this context, balancedness and σ-balancedness criteria for large classes of cooperative games are proven.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 149-160 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1996 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
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