Core, value and equilibria for market games: On a problem of Aumann and Shapley

Dan Butnariu, Erich Peter Klement

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this note a partial solution of Open Problem 41C of Aumann and Shapley [1974, pp. 250-251] is presented. A sufficient condition for the Aumann-Shapley value of a market game to exist, to be contained in its core, and to be the competitive payoff distribution of a transferable utility competitive equilibrium is given. In this context, balancedness and σ-balancedness criteria for large classes of cooperative games are proven.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)149-160
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume25
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 1996

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Core, value and equilibria for market games: On a problem of Aumann and Shapley'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this