Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

Ezra Einy; Ron Holzman; Dov Monderer; Benyamin Shitovitz

doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2304

Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer, Benyamin Shitovitz

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We show that the core of a continuous convex game on a measurable space of players is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. We also extend the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set to games with a measurable space of players and show that for continuous convex games the core may be strictly included in the bargaining set but it coincides with the set of all countably additive payoff measures in the bargaining set. We provide examples which show that the continuity assumption is essential to our results.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-12
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	76
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2304
State	Published - Sep 1997

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* We are grateful to an Associate Editor of this journal for his careful reading and helpful comments. -Research supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. Research supported by the M. and M. L. Bank Mathematics Research Fund and by the Fund for the Promotion of Research at the Technion. 9Research supported by the Fund for the Promotion of Research at the Technion.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.1997.2304

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Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

Abstract

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