Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics

Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer, Benyamin Shitovitz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of finitely many non-atomic probability measures is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. This result is used to characterize some stable sets of large games which have a decreasing returns to scale property. We also study exact non-atomic glove-market games. In particular we show that in a glove-market game which consists of the minimum of finitely many mutually singular non-atomic measures, the core is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set iff the game is exact. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71, D24.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)200-211
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1996

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* We thank Sergiu Hart, Yossi Greenberg, and Abraham Neyman for very helpful discussions concerning this work. -This author's research was supported by the Tragovnik Research Fund and by the fund for the promotion of research at the Technion. Part of this work was done while this author was visiting the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, the Hebrew University and the Department of Economics at McGill University.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this