Abstract
We present a novel approach for semantically targeted adversarial attacks on Optical Flow. In such attacks the goal is to corrupt the flow predictions of a specific object category or instance. Usually, an attacker seeks to hide the adversarial perturbations in the input. However, a quick scan of the output reveals the attack. In contrast, our method helps to hide the attacker’s intent in the output flow as well. We achieve this thanks to a regularization term that encourages off-target consistency. We perform extensive tests on leading optical flow models to demonstrate the benefits of our approach in both white-box and black-box settings. Also, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack on subsequent tasks that depend on the optical flow.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Computer Vision – ACCV 2022 - 16th Asian Conference on Computer Vision, Proceedings |
Editors | Lei Wang, Juergen Gall, Tat-Jun Chin, Imari Sato, Rama Chellappa |
Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH |
Pages | 501-517 |
Number of pages | 17 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783031262920 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2023 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | 16th Asian Conference on Computer Vision, ACCV 2022 - Macao, China Duration: 4 Dec 2022 → 8 Dec 2022 |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
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Volume | 13847 LNCS |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
Conference | 16th Asian Conference on Computer Vision, ACCV 2022 |
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Country/Territory | China |
City | Macao |
Period | 4/12/22 → 8/12/22 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Keywords
- Adversarial attacks
- Optical flow
- Semantic attacks
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Theoretical Computer Science
- General Computer Science