Connectionist modeling and theorizing: Who does the explaining and how?

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review


Green's (1998) criticism that connectionist models are devoid of theoretical substance rests on a simplistic view of the nature of connectionist models and a failure to acknowledge the division of labor between the model and the modeller in the enterprise of connectionist modelling. The "theoretical terms" of connectionist theory are not to be found in processing units or in connections but in more abstract characterizations of the functional properties of networks. Moreover, these properties are and at present should be - only loosely tied to the known (and largely unknown) properties of neural networks in the brain.

Original languageEnglish
StatePublished - 1998


  • Artificial intelligence
  • Cognition
  • Computer modelling
  • Connectionism
  • Epistemology
  • Explanation
  • Methodology
  • Neural nets
  • Philosophy of science
  • Theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Psychology


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