Condorcet winners and social acceptability

Muhammad Mahajne, Oscar Volij

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals who rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals who rank it among the least preferred half. A Condorcet winner may not necessarily be socially acceptable. However, if preferences are single-peaked, single-dipped, or satisfy the single-crossing property, any Condorcet winner is socially acceptable. We identify maximal families of preferences that guarantee that Condorcet winners are socially acceptable.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)641-653
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2019
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Condorcet winners and social acceptability'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this